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Introduction
Countries rely on the soundness and liquidity of the international banking system for their own national financial integrity. Over the past century, the strength of that system has been tested in times of crisis, and reformed to prevent those past crises from recurring. The banking crisis of 2007 -2009 prompted a new industry consensus regarding the need for further reform to the governance of financial institutions (Institute of International Finance, 2008) . New, more detailed principles for enhancing the governance of financial institutions were subsequently released by the Basel Committee in 2010 (hereafter BCBS, 2010) . Five years on from the crisis we review the progress that has been made at the national level towards adopting these reforms. Our specific research question is: to what extent do national governance codes for financial institutions now reflect best practice, as defined by BCBS (2010)?
We find that thorough adoption of BCBS (2010) is rare in any of the countries that we have examined, and no country has yet completely adopted the principles into its own code. The European Union (EU) has the highest scores for its compliance with BCBS, followed by Singapore and Canada. Australia ranks about halfway down the list of eleven countries. The areas that have been focused on by national governments are audit and internal controls, disclosure and transparency, and compensation aligned to prudent risk-taking. Those that have had the least attention are 'understand your structure', 'know your structure', group structure, identifying and monitoring risk, and robust internal communications. We present several hypotheses that could explain the lack of progress in the reform of bank governance.
In analysing country compliance with BCBS (2010), we are making the implicit assumptions that better governance will prevent failures in the banking system; that more guidance will improve governance; and that such governance would not be forthcoming without that regulation. These assumptions have some support in the literature, and are implicit in the recommendations of BCBS (2010) and industry leaders. Schleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738 ) present the counter argument, against regulation, which is that competition between organisations for external capital should force firms to adopt practices that minimise their costs, including corporate governance.
Banks, like all large corporations with diffuse ownership, suffer from agency problems that may be mitigated through governance mechanisms. Financial institutions are, however, unlike other corporations due to the potential for externalities in the event of failure (systemic risk and taxpayerfunded support) and the associated possibility of moral hazard. The incentive conflicts that exist between shareholders, debt/deposit holders and the wider community mean that it is extremely unlikely that firms, of their own volition, will unilaterally take the actions that are needed to restrain excessive risk-taking and risk-shifting. Indeed, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show that banks with the most shareholder-friendly governance performed worst during the crisis of 2008. We therefore argue that regulation is necessary to reform governance systems in a manner that will ultimately weaken the rights of shareholders and strengthen those of other stakeholder groups.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature on the implementation of the Basel Accords. Section 3 describes the method used in the analysis. In Section 4, we present the results of our investigation in terms of country scores for individual and aggregate compliance with the 14 core principles of BCBS (2010) . Section 5 discusses the results including possible explanations, and Section 6 concludes.
Prior literature
Our paper assumes the effectiveness of bank regulation; what then is the evidence to support the proposition that more regulation of governance is effective? We are not aware of any research that examines this issue in the specific context of banks, but a growing literature is emerging with regard to the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) on corporations in general. SOX was introduced in the US as a response to corporate scandals including Enron, and is considered to be one of the most significant pieces of legislation ever enacted to address deficiencies of corporate governance. Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner and Nanda (2013) show that SOX has been effective in moderating the risk-taking tendencies of overconfident CEOs. Arping and Sautner (2013) find that SOX had a positive effect on corporate disclosure quality. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond (2009) show that changes in internal control quality resulting from SOX reduce firm risk. These papers have drawn the data used in their analyses from well-recognised databases, mitigating any potential biases in the measures used to evaluate SOX.
In the banking regulation literature, prior research has examined the impact of regulation generally on bank risk. In order to measure regulation, the majority of researchers employ the World Bank Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the World, which has been conducted regularly since [1998] [1999] . The survey questions number in the hundreds and examine many issues including the regulation of capital, depositor protection, liquidity, market entry, asset classification provisioning and write-offs, external audit and banking activities. Only in the most recent version of the survey (conducted in 2011/12) is regulation of governance explored and this section contains only eight questions. We note that the World Bank Survey is sent to supervisory agencies in each of 143 countries as at 2011. The survey method therefore relies on the candour of these agencies who self-report on the supervisory environment in their own country.
Most of the researchers examining the impact of regulation on bank risk using the World Bank data have found support for regulation, or at least certain forms of regulation. Barth, Caprio Jr and Levine (2004) use World Bank Survey data to support greater disclosure but failed to find support for more stringent capital requirements and activity restrictions. Pasiouras, Gaganis and Zopounidis (2006) find that capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, inter alia, have a significant effect on bank ratings. Laeven and Levine (2009) find that capital regulations and activity restrictions can reduce risk, but this depends on the ownership structure of the bank. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that stricter capital requirements and more independent supervision resulted in better performance during the 2008 crisis. Klomp and de Haan (2012) show that many measures of bank regulation and supervision have a significant effect on high-risk banks. Most recently, Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Peria and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012) find significant differences in regulation and supervision between crisis and non-crisis countries, including that crisis-hit countries were more than twice as likely as non-crisis countries to introduce regulation or guidance in relation to remuneration.
Another potential source of data on regulatory effectiveness is the Financial Sector Assessment program (FSAP) . Since 1999 the IMF and the World Bank have evaluated how countries have complied with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs). Unfortunately the BCP scores are not publicly available but World Bank researchers have analysed their relationship to risk. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) find that BCP compliance is not robustly associated with measures of bank risk. This result could be explained by the fact that assessments of the effectiveness of supervision are relatively subjective, as they go well beyond the simple existence of national codes.
In relation to our specific research question on the adoption of governance regulations, prior literature is very limited. This is hardly surprising for two reasons: the focus on governance regulation is a relatively new phenomenon that is only beginning to be reflected in the extant literature, and the regulations have changed since the time of the most recent World Bank survey. A key finding of Cihak et. al. (2012) , using the World Bank data, is that governance of regulation has been an area of focus since the financial crisis. But more detailed analysis beyond that of the eight governance regulation questions on the World Bank survey is needed. The date of the most recent Basel Committee guidance on governance is October 2010. Many countries may not have had the opportunity to implement new governance regulations when the World Bank survey commenced in 2011, and so an up-to-date analysis that considers responses to this guidance is needed.
The research most relevant to this paper is the Financial Stability Board (FSB)'s 'Thematic Review on Risk Governance' released in 2013. This analyses both self-reported national authorities' oversight of risk governance practices and self-reported firms' risk governance practices. The FSB note improvements in regulatory and supervisory oversight of risk governance at financial institutions since the financial crisis. However there are differences in progress across various regions, with firms in more advanced economies having more desirable risk governance practices. Interestingly, many of the best risk practices at firms that they surveyed were more advanced than the relevant national guidance.
To summarise, there is evidence in the literature that greater regulation of banks has been helpful in reducing their risk. This conclusion would support any research agenda to assess progress in reforming regulations in relation to bank governance. However, our research question is also motivated by the timing of our investigation, five years after the most recent banking crisis and three years after the revisions to the Basel Code. It allows us to determine whether national regulators have followed through on their rhetorical responses to that banking crisis and which led to the more detailed governance principles of BCBS (2010) . To the extent that national regulators have not adopted BCBS (2010), then further actions at the international level may be needed to prevent the next banking crisis.
Method
We evaluated the national governance codes as at January 2013 for ten countries and the EU against each of the 14 governance principles in BCBS (2010). We began our selection of countries by considering all countries in the G20. We then restricted our attention to those countries from the G20 with major financial institutions under their jurisdiction. We also included Switzerland and Singapore in the study. Switzerland was included because it is a major financial centre in Europe and experienced problems during the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . We included Singapore because it is a major financial centre within Asia.
In 2011, the European Banking Authority published Guidelines on Internal Governance, with which 27 countries within the EU have indicated either their compliance or their intention to comply 1 . Although many of these countries also have national guidelines and regulations, much of that documentation is not in English. The national guidelines and regulatory documents for both Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are available in English. We analysed these two countries separately, which allows us to compare and contrast their national governance codes to those of the EU.
The study covers countries from Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia. The list of countries includes two less developed countries (China and Indonesia), countries that experienced problems during the financial crisis (such as Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) and those that did not (such as Australia, Canada and China). The list of countries included in the study can be found in Appendix 1.
For each country in the study, we evaluated local guidance and regulatory documents against each of the 14 governance principles in BCBS (2010). For each governance principle we assigned a rating from zero to three for each country according to the criteria in Table 1 . When reviewing each country, we only considered what is documented in its national governance codes. This extensive review of each country's guidance and regulatory documents was carried out by a research assistant with a background in law and independently reviewed by at least one of the authors. Cross-checking was also conducted to ensure consistency of ratings across the three authors. The list of the guidance and regulatory documents reviewed for each country in the study can be found in Appendix 1.
Table 1: Rating Criteria
The 14 governance principles in BCBS (2010) against each county's guidance and regulatory documents using the following criteria:
Consider there to be nothing explicit or capable of reasonable implication within the national regulatory framework that deals with the particular BCBS (2010) governance principle. 1
May be impliedly dealt with through a particular provision or group of provisions, despite the wording not being of a substantially similar form and substance or the national regulation does not deal with all components of the particular BCBS (2010) governance principle. 2
Substantially similar wording to and dealing with the particular governance principle parallel to the description provided in BCBS (2010). 3
Extensive dealing with the particular BCBS (2010) governance principle.
We acknowledge that the analysis of guidance and regulatory documents does not fully capture all aspects of the regulation of governance. The role of supervision to enforce rules-based regulations or to assist financial institutions to adopt principles-based regulations is arguably a vital element of the regulatory framework. Assessing the quality of supervision is, however, a complex matter and beyond the scope of this study.
1 See Appendix 2
In the final stage of our research, we provided each of the prudential regulators with a draft of the paper for comment. The objective was to increase the robustness of our analysis, by minimising the possibility that we had missed or misinterpreted relevant documents. The responses of those regulators who replied (Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore and the US) were assessed and, where relevant, incorporated into the current version of the paper.
Results

More detailed guidance from Basel Committee over time.
Over time the Basel Committee has produced three increasingly detailed documents providing guidance on the governance of banking organisations. The first, BCBS (1999) consisted of only 14 pages and was produced in September 1999. It was developed in the context of the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s and drew from the OECD governance principles 2 produced also in 1999. A Only four years later it was found necessary to produce a greatly expanded guidance document to address 'corporate governance failures and lapses' (BCBS, 2010, paragraph [6] ) that had occurred in the intervening years. Produced after a consultative process, BCBS (2010) The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing the implementation of the banks strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and corporate values. The board is also responsible for providing oversight of senior management.
2
The board of directors should approve and oversee the bank's strategic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking organisation.
Board members should be and remain qualified, including through training, for their positions. They should have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound and objective judgment about the affairs of the bank.
3
The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation.
The board should define appropriate governance practices for its own work and have in place the means to ensure that such practices are followed and periodically reviewed for ongoing improvement.
4
The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy.
In a group structure, the board of the parent company has the overall responsibility for adequate corporate governance across the group and ensuring that there are governance policies and mechanisms appropriate to the structure, business and risks of the group and its entities.
5
The board and senior management should effectively utilise the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control functions.
Under the direction of the board, senior management should ensure that the bank's activities are consistent with the business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board.
6
The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the bank's corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment.
Banks should have an effective internal controls system and a risk management function (including a chief risk officer or equivalent) with sufficient authority, stature, independence, resources and access to the board.
7
The bank should be governed in a transparent manner.
Risks should be identified and monitored on an ongoing firm-wide and individual entity basis, and the sophistication of the bank's risk management and internal control infrastructures should keep pace with any changes to the bank's risk profile (including its growth), and to the external risk landscape.
8
The board and senior management should understand the bank's operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (i.e. "know-yourstructure").
Effective risk management requires robust internal communication within the bank about risk, both across the organisation and through reporting to the board and senior management.
9
The board and senior management should effectively utilise the work conducted by internal audit functions, external auditors and internal control functions.
10
The board should actively oversee the compensation system's design and operation, and should monitor and review the compensation system to ensure that it operates as intended.
11
An employee's compensation should be effectively aligned with prudent risk taking: compensation should be adjusted for all types of risk; compensation outcomes should be symmetric with risk outcomes; compensation payout schedules should be sensitive to the time horizon of risks; and the mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation should be consistent with risk alignment.
12
The board and senior management should know and understand the bank's operational structure and the risks that it poses (ie "know-your-structure").
13
Where a bank operates through special-purpose or related structures or in jurisdictions that impede transparency or do not meet international banking standards, its board and senior management should understand the purpose, structure and unique risks of these operations. They should also seek to mitigate the risks identified (i.e. "understand-yourstructure").
14
The governance of the bank should be adequately transparent to its shareholders, depositors, other relevant stakeholders and market participants.
Are the Basel Committee guidelines reflected in national codes?
In Appendix 3 we present our analysis of the fourteen principles in turn and by country. Principle 1, for example, includes fourteen specific recommendations. For each recommendation we assigned a rating from zero to three (as explained above) for each country. The median rating across countries is shown for each recommendation.
We note some specific recommendations for which coverage appears surprisingly low. In all the examples listed here the median rating across countries is either zero or one. Paragraph references from BCBS (2010) are shown in square brackets.
1.7
Timely elevation of problems to higher levels [28] In order to capture the overall extent of compliance with BCBS (2010) we then produced a rating from 1-5 (where five represents comprehensive coverage across all recommendations and one represents no coverage) for each country for each of the fourteen principles. We apply an equal weighting for each sub-principle. This information is presented in Table 3 . The analysis of national governance codes relative to BCBS (2010) reveals that no country has comprehensive coverage as at January 2013.
It is evident that some of the principles are addressed more comprehensively than others. Taking a simple average across all the countries we find that the least thoroughly treated are (in order): We next considered the relative strength of national governance codes for banking organisations. We ranked countries in two ways, recognising that rankings may vary depending on the weightings assigned to each governance principle. Firstly we took a simple average of all fourteen principles. Secondly we took an average across only the principles that the Basel Committee believes to be 'key' (see paragraph 6 of BCBS 2010) which allowed us to exclude only principles 4 and 9. Again we use an equal weighting approach. Results are presented in Table 4 .
Table 3: Coverage of Basel Governance Principles By Country
We evaluate local guidance/regulations against each of 14 governance principles in BCBS (2010). Within each principle there are a number of specific recommendations. Ratings are as follows: 5 = all recommendations covered, 4 = most recommendations covered (generally >60%), 3 = moderate coverage of recommendations (generally 30-60%), 2 = slight coverage (generally <30%) and 1 = no coverage. Average rating 2.9 3.4 2.6 4.1 2.4 2.6 2.4 3.1 2.7 3.4 2.9
The EU is the only jurisdiction with a rating above four; this applies regardless of the ranking methodology. Principles 5 and 9 stand out as the only areas of weakness for the EU in an otherwise extremely comprehensive coverage of governance principles.
The next group of three countries (Singapore, Canada and the UK) all have ratings between three and four representing at least moderate coverage across all principles. The rankings are the same regardless of the methodology. Note that this group includes two countries that weathered the financial crisis well and one that did not (i.e. the UK).
Other bodies have produced findings consistent with our own. For example, FSB (2012) finds that national regulators need to strengthen their guidance with regard to governance (recommendation 1 at page 4). The IMF's Financial Supervision Assessment Program (FSAP) also provides analysis of supervision programs in many countries. Recent reports 3 have recommended more guidance in relation to enterprise risk management. Finally, World Bank (2012) also finds gaps in the area of bank governance (see Section 6).
Table 4: Country Rankings
We evaluate local guidance/regulations against each of 14 governance principles in BCBS (2010) and a score is allocated for each (see Table 2 ). An average score is calculated for each country across all 14 principles or the 12 key principles. Higher scores indicate greater coverage in local regulations/guidance documents. Countries are then ranked from highest to lowest. We note that seven countries have scores below three, including the two less developed countries (China and Indonesia). Once again, this group includes countries that experienced problems during the crisis (such as Switzerland and the US) as well as those that did not (Australia, China).
The last column of Table 4 highlights the date of the most recent update of national governance codes at the time of our analysis. With the exception of Indonesia, all countries had updated their guidance on governance since the financial crisis, and most had been updated since BCBS (2010) was released. We note that Singapore has updated its guidance since the date of our analysis and the US has indicated that they are developing a corporate governance handbook.
With regard to Australia we note the relatively poor compliance with the principles relating to risk management (i.e. Principles 6-8). At the time of writing, it is expected that a new set of risk management standards will be released for consultation, which would lead to an increase in these Australian ratings in due course.
The case of Germany also warrants special mention. At the website of the European Banking Authority (www.eba.europa.eu) we find a 'Confirmation of Compliance' table referring to GL44 Internal Governance standards. According to this table, Germany (along with many other European nations) intends to comply with these European governance standards. Once implemented, this would place Germany at the same level as the EU itself in terms of compliance with governance standards.
Discussion of Results
The previous section documents the slow progress in disseminating comprehensive standards for effective governance of banking organisations. Despite the fact that almost five years have elapsed since the pivotal collapse of Lehman Brothers and two years have elapsed since the Basel Committee produced its revised principles for enhanced governance, few countries have introduced internal governance standards that come close to the Basel Committee standard. This is true even for some developed countries and despite the enthusiasm for governance reform at the height of the banking crisis in 2009. What explains this apparent lack of progress? We present a number of possible explanations.
a) National regulators disagree with Basel Committee approach. The lack of progress could be explained by lack of support from national banking supervisors for the Basel Committee recommendations, either in general or for particular principles. However, this seems unlikely given the consistency of the principles in BCBS (2010) with the findings of senior supervisors at the height of the crisis (see Senior Supervisors Group, 2008).
We note that BCBS (2010) went through a consultation process before it was released. The submissions made to the Basel Committee are publicly available 4 and provide no hint of any major concerns from the industry (although some recommendations are made for changes at the margins). The working group on corporate governance responsible for BCBS (2010) had representatives from supervisors in Belgium, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US and EU as well as the OECD, the World Bank and the Financial Stability Institute. At the very least we can say that many national supervisors had a say in the development of the governance principles. We find no evidence to suggest that national supervisors disagree with the direction of BCBS (2010).
We did, however, encounter some concerns with regard to the highly prescriptive nature of BCBS (2010). Principles-based regulators 5 such as the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and Office for the Supervision of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) tend to avoid detailed and prescriptive guidance, arguing that more rigorous and effective supervision can be achieved without it. By setting down principles only, the supervisor avoids a 'checklist' approach that may foster gaming of regulations whereby banks appear to be compliant but in fact lack any genuine commitment to regulatory objectives. The success of the principles-based approach relies on strong political support for the prudential supervisor and a supervisory approach that is 'intrusive, sceptical, proactive, comprehensive, adaptive and conclusive ' (Vinals and Fleichter, 2010) . We are mindful of this attitude towards regulations as we interpret our findings. However we note that a preference for a principles-based approach over a rules-based approach does not fully explain the lack of progress towards full adoption of Basel Committee recommendations. Australia and Canada were ranked in the top half of the countries we investigated for the consistency of their national regulations with Basel Committee principles.
A variation on this explanation for lack of progress towards full implementation of the Basel Committee principles is that national regulators have had other work of higher priority, and time and resources have not been available for governance issues. This is in itself a statement about the relative priority given to different aspects of the reform agenda. Again, this could be connected to the point that issues of culture and governance are uncomfortable territory for many supervisors compared with the more familiar ground of capital adequacy and liquidity. Indeed, statements of the Basel Committee itself seem to suggest that governance has slipped down the agenda over the last four years.
BCBS (2009), produced in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, is a statement of intent explaining the program of reform to replace Basel II. In this document risk governance is front and centre with multiple pages devoted to governance related issues such as the need for enhanced risk oversight. By contrast, when the final Basel III program was announced in BCBS (2011), governance was conspicuously absent, with the word mentioned only once in the introduction. The fact that the principles for enhanced governance are contained in a separate document (i.e. BCBS, 2010) may create the impression that governance is not a core part of the Basel III reforms.
This argument is weakened, however, by the fact that most countries in our study have updated their banking governance codes since the financial crisis. This suggests that at least some resources have been available, although arguably not to the same degree as other elements of the Basel III reforms.
b) The principles are too challenging to measure and to monitor. While it is difficult to argue with the thrust of the Basel Committee governance recommendations, some may question their efficacy.
Simply promulgating a set of principles does not necessarily change behaviour and supervisory guidance without enforcement may have little impact.
Many aspects of governance are subjective in nature, possibly causing prudential supervisors to question their own ability to provide adequate supervision. For example, BCBS (2010) The challenges of supervising governance standards are clear, especially when compared with the more objective issues that prudential supervisors have traditionally focussed on (such as capital adequacy and liquidity ratios). Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that establishing a national code of governance principles can do any damage. For those Directors and senior executives making a genuine attempt to improve the governance of their organisations, a clear set of guiding principles can only provide direction and support. In boardroom debates, clear principles will provide a framework for discussion even if they are aspirational to some degree. Without national governance principles there may be justification to argue that national supervisors do not see governance as a priority.
c) Behavioural and Political Explanations
A third set of explanations for the apparent lack of progress documented in this paper falls outside the usual realms of economic analysis. There may be behavioural factors influencing the responses of national regulators, and there may be other political considerations and complications that have affected or even frustrated the implementation of international agreements such as BCBS (2010).
National regulators may be overconfident in their own ability and that of their national institutions. While few would argue against the need for governance reform in the broad, it is often the case that people believe the greatest problems exist 'elsewhere' or with other people. Humans are often over-confident of their own abilities or in the characteristics of their home institutions, sometimes through a sense of loyalty or patriotism. Kahneman (2011, Chapter 24) discusses the pervasive optimism bias, the illusion of control and the over-confidence bias, all of which appear relevant to this explanation. Presumably national supervisors are not immune from these behavioural biases, which would potentially cause them to under-estimate the need for governance reform in their home country, or to see it as a low priority.
One factor that might contribute to an overconfidence effect on the part of supervisors is known in the literature as "regulatory capture", which in this situation could be described as the acquisition (or capture) by banks of the regulations that are designed to discipline them, so that those regulations operate primarily for their own benefit (based on Stigler, 1971) . Such an effect would be more likely when the number of (powerful) banks is smaller, and when the effect of the regulation falls heavily on banks and only marginally benefits voters. This portrayal of the politics of regulation and bank supervision may be relevant in some jurisdictions.
Domestic political imperatives may have frustrated attempts to implement local governance regulations in some countries. At the national level, there are inherent conflicts of interest relating to governments in their oversight of the banking system, as clearly explained by Calomiris and Haber (forthcoming). Calomiris and Haber observe that banking systems around the world continue to experience banking crises and instability, and continue to adopt practices that exacerbate economic cycles. They examine the evolution of the rules of the banking game in a number of countries, and find that although different rules and regulations have emerged in different countries, similar underlying conflicts of interests in respect to setting those rules have faced all governments. In terms of the adoption of international agreements about banking, their work is consistent with national banking regulations being strongly influenced by political coalitions that support the government.
Another political influence on compliance with international agreements by national governments to consider is explained by Putnam's theory of two-level games, first proposed in 1988. This theory conceives of international negotiations as a two-level game for sovereign and democratic decisionmakers (Putnam, 1988, p. 434) . At the international level, national governments must balance domestic pressures to adopt favourable policies with the need for constructive coalitions at the international level, which may necessitate the adoption of less favourable policies. In the instance described in this paper, it may be the case that there is insufficient pressure at the international level to over-ride domestic considerations.
Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 highlighted the need for further reforms to the governance of financial institutions, which were delivered in 2010 when the Basel Committee released BCBS (2010).
In this paper, we seek to inform the ongoing process directed at reform of the governance of financial institutions by examining the extent to which the national governance codes for financial institutions now reflect best practice, as defined by BCBS (2010). Specifically, we analyse the national governance codes as at January 2013 of 10 countries and the EU against each of the 14 core governance principles in BCBS (2010). This is a timely investigation of this question, based on independent and rigorous analysis rather than self-reported information from national regulators.
We find that thorough adoption of the 14 principles in BCBS (2010) is rare in any of the countries that we have examined and not one country has adopted all of the principles into its own national governance code. The areas in which national regulators have made reforms to their governance codes are in audit and internal controls, disclosure and transparency, and compensation aligned to prudent risk-taking. The areas that have received the least attention by national regulators are understand your structure, know your structure, corporate structure, the identification and monitoring of risk, and robust internal communications.
We acknowledge that analysis of codes and regulatory documents does not capture all aspects of a regulatory framework, and that strength of supervision may be a substitute, at least in part, for apparent gaps or weaknesses in codes and regulations. We also acknowledge that despite our extensive search for documents related to governance of banking organisations, it is possible that we have missed some or that we have misinterpreted those that we have. In the case of non-English speaking countries it is possible that some concepts have been lost in the translations at our disposal. To mitigate this possibility, we consulted with national supervisors for feedback on our analysis and evidence or further information that we have not previously considered or that we may have misunderstood. Such feedback that we have received has been incorporated into our analysis and this paper.
Prima facie, our findings suggest that in spite of the progress made by national regulators in adopting the best practice governance principles established by the Basel Committee, more complete adoption is needed in many countries, particularly in the areas of operational structure and the identification and monitoring of risk. We have identified several potential reasons for this selective adoption of the Basel Committee principles, including a preference for a more principlesbased approach, perceived difficulties enforcing the governance principles, overconfidence by regulators in their own abilities or in the characteristics of their home institutions, and domestic political considerations. Whatever the reasons, we strongly encourage national regulators to continue to reform their national governance guidance in line with best practice so that another financial crisis can be avoided. Principle 3: The board should define appropriate governance practices for its own work and have in place the means to ensure that such practices are followed and periodically reviewed for ongoing improvement. Principle 4: In a group structure, the board of the parent company has the overall responsibility for adequate corporate governance across the group and ensuring that there are governance policies and mechanisms appropriate to the structure, business and risks of the group and its entities. Principle 10: The board should actively oversee the compensation system's design and operation, and should monitor and review the compensation system to ensure that it operate as intended 10.2 The board members who are most actively involved in the design and operation of the compensation system (eg as members of the board's compensation committee) should be independent, non-executive members with substantial knowledge about compensation arrangements and the incentives and risks that can arise from such arrangements: at [107] . Principle 13: Where a bank operates through special-purpose or related structures or in jurisdictions that impede transparency or do not meet international banking standards, its board and senior management should understand the purpose, structure and unique risks of these operations. They should also seek to mitigate the risks identified (ie 'understand your structure'). 14.1 The bank should disclose relevant and useful information that supports the key areas of corporate governance identified by the Committee. Such disclosure should be proportionate to the size, complexity, structure, economic significance and risk profile of the bank: at [128] . 3  3  3  3  3  0  3  3  3  3  3  3 14.2 In general the bank should apply the disclosure and transparency section of the 2004 OECD Principles: at [129] 
References
Basel Principles
Paragraph references in []
Board of a Parent Company
Basel Principles
